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RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN WASHINGTON-
PRESENT AND FUTURE
PHILIP A. TRAUTMAN*
A perennial problem confronting the attorney preparing for trial is
whether his client has a right to a jury. In many, probably most,
instances a trial to the court will be desired by all parties concerned.
This may be because of the fear of prejudice on the part of a jury, or
the desire for a more speedy trial before the judge, or the object of
cutting expenses, or any of the other innumerable factors to be weighed
in determining whether judge or jury is best for one's particular case.
In other instances the sole question at issue will be one of law so that
regardless of the wishes of the parties, the only determination to be
made will be that by the judge. Assuming, however, that there are issues
of fact and that the attorney would prefer that such issues be decided
by a jury, the question is posed: Does my client have a right to a trial
by jury?
The many appeals to the Washington court illustrate that this is an
ever-present problem. Most recently the problem was evidenced by
Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc.1 The plaintiff initiated an action to
recover the purchase price of a lot plus the money paid on a contract
with the defendant for the construction of a house on the lot. In the
prayer of the complaint, the plaintiff asked that the contract be re-
scinded and that damages be awarded. The trial court found an
implied warranty in the contract that the home would be fit for human
habitation, a breach of such warranty, and awarded damages to the
plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant assigned error in that the trial
court denied it a jury trial. The claim was that while the case began
as a suit in equity for rescission in which there was no right to a jury
trial, the proceeding later became an action at law for breach of war-
ranty and thus a right to a jury trial arose. The court summarily
disposed of this contention by pointing out that the defendant had
never filed a demand for a jury.
By statute one must make a demand for a jury trial and pay a twelve
dollar fee or he will be deemed to have waived any right thereto.2
Specifically, the statute provides, "Unless such statement is fied and
such deposit made, the parties shall be deemed to have waived trial
by jury. . . ." Though an earlier statute had used the word "will"
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
52 Wn.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
2RCW 4.44.100.
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rather than "shall" and thus it is arguable that a failure to comply
with the statute should automatically result in a trial to the court, it
is nevertheless settled that the statute is not mandatory upon the court.
In the event of a failure to timely file a demand or pay the fee the
court has discretion in determining whether to impanel a jury.' It is
to be noted, however, that while one may be granted a jury trial
without having complied with the statute, the right to a jury is gone.
Though the right may be lost by failing to file a demand or pay the
fee, this has not created the most difficult problem. More basic is the
question of when one has a right in the first place. If a right exists,
it can be implemented by filing the demand and fee. But if a right does
not already exist, filing a demand will not create one. It is with this
more basic problem that this article is concerned. In particular, atten-
tion will be directed to the right to a jury in civil actions in the superior
courts of Washington. In addition to analyzing the cases which have
presented the problem in the past, a few suggestions will be offered as
to the possible effects of the new rules of pleading, practice and pro-
cedure which will become effective January 1, 1960.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
First to be considered are the constitutional provisions. The seventh
amendment to the federal constitution provides that, "In suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.. ." This provision pre-
serves the right to a jury in the federal courts and is implemented by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The guarantee does not, however,
apply to the states.' Nor is there anything in the fourteenth amend-
ment to the federal constitution that requires a jury trial." The power
of the state to regulate the right to jury trial is limited only by the
state's own constitution
The Washington constitution in article I, section 21, provides that,
"the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." It is this provision
that forms the basis for determining the scope of the right in this state.
8 Davis v. Falconer, 159 Wash. 230, 292 Pac. 424 (1930). The plaintiff did not
timely deposit his jury fee. The defendant contended the statute thereby compelled
that the plaintiff's request for a jury be denied. Held, the fact that the condition of
the statute had not been complied with did not give the defendant a vested right to
have the case tried without a jury. "Had the legislature so intended, it would have
been easy to have so expressly provided" One perhaps wonders what the legislature
did intend by changing "will" to "shall!"
&FE. R. Civ. P. 38, 39.
5 Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) ; Mountain Timber Co.
v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).6 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
7 Southern Ry. v. City of Durham, 266 U.S. 178 (1924).
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In numerous decisions it has been stated that the constitutional
provision has reference to the right to jury trial as it existed in the
territory at the time the constitution was adopted.8 This, in turn,
requires a determination as to whether either the common law or a
statute provided for such right at the time of adoption. A case em-
ploying this rationale is State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Macy.'
The state medical board revoked the appellant's license to practice
medicine as an osteopath. A statute provided for an appeal to the
superior court and for a trial de novo as in an ordinary civil action.
The appellant contended that he was entitled to a jury trial under the
constitutional provision. The court held that he was not upon the basis
that no such proceeding was available at common law nor did any
statute provide for the issuance of revocation of licenses of physicians
prior to the adoption of the state constitution. Moreover, the fact
that a later statute in providing for an appeal stated that the case
"shall stand for trial in all respects as ordinary civil actions, and like
proceedings be had thereon,' did not necessarily create a right to a
jury since all civil actions do not require a jury trial.
It is to be noted that even if the common law did not give a right to
a jury, the existence of a statute at the time of the constitution's
adoption is sufficient. Thus, where a territorial statute provided that
a person might demand a jury to decide the question of his insanity,
the constitutional guarantee preserved that right to the extent given
by the statute' 1
All this does not mean that certain features of the jury system as
it existed when the constitution was adopted cannot be changed by
the legislature. So long as the right to a jury remains with its funda-
mental of a trial before an impartial group of one's peers, that is
sufficient. Thus, the qualifications for jury service can be changed.
For example, though a juror did not have to be a taxpayer under the
laws of the territory, this is now required by statute," and the change
has been held constitutional. 3
Moreover, the fact that a particular cause of action existed at the
time of the adoption of the constitution and that one could have that
cause tried before a jury does not mean that the legislature is powerless
8 State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 47 Pac. 958 (1897).
92 Wash. 614, 159 Pac. 801 (1916).
10 Rzm. & B~As CODE § 8399.
"In re Ellern, 23 Wn.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945).
12 RCW 2.36.070.
'1 State v. McDowell, 61 Wash. 398, 112 Pac. 521 (1911). See also Bellingham v.
Hite, 37 Wn.2d 652, 225 P.2d 895 (1950).
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to abolish the cause of action and the right to a jury to enforce it.
Probably the best case illustrating this point is State ex rel. Davis-
Smitk Co. v. Clausen," sustaining the constitutionality of the state
workmen's compensation act. It was contended that the legislature in
establishing workmen's compensation with its statutory schedule of
payments had unconstitutionally deprived both the employer and his
employees of their common law right to a jury trial to determine the
right of the employee to recover for an injury and the amount of
damages. It was held that it was competent for the legislature in the
exercise of its police power to regulate extra hazardous industries by
establishing a compensation system. Since the legislature could destroy
the employee's common law cause of action for damages, it followed
that the jury trial incident to that cause of action could likewise be
destroyed. In other words, the constitution does not prohibit the
legislature from abolishing a cause of action which existed at the time
of adoption of the constitution. If the cause of action is abolished,
there is nothing left upon which a jury trial can operate. 5
The same principle was applied by the court in sustaining the host-
guest statute, which relieved an operator of a car from suits by invited
guests unless the accident was intentional. The fact that a jury trial
for negligence was thereby abolished did not violate the constitution
since the legislature could destroy the cause of action for negligence
itself. That being true there was nothing left to be tried by a jury."
One might summarize then by saying that the constitutional pro-
vision relating to jury trials does not guarantee that a cause of action
which existed at the time of the constitution's adoption will be con-
tinued. It only guarantees that if it is continued, a right to jury trial
incident thereto will continue.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In implementing the state constitutional provision that "the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," the legislature has enacted
several general statutes which must be considered in evaluating one's
right to a jury trial. RCW 4.44.080 provides that all questions of law
including the admissibility of testimony, the facts preliminary to such
admission, the construction of statutes and other writings, and the
1465 Wash. 156,117 Pac. 1101 (1911).
15 eprinciple was reaffirmed as to the compulsory industrial insurance law in
State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645 (1913), affirmed in Moun-
tain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
16 Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
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other rules of evidence are to be decided by the court. All questions
of fact other than those mentioned in RCW 4.44.080 shall be decided
by the jury' 7
Read literally these two statutes would mean that anytime there
was a question of fact involved, such question should be decided by a
jury except in the instances specified in RCW 4.44.080. Such, however,
was not the purpose of these provisions. It was not the intention of
the legislature to require that all questions of fact be decided by a jury,
but rather to assure that all questions of law should be decided by the
court.
This is indicated by two other statutes. Issues of fact in actions for
the recovery of money only or of specific real or personal property are
directed to be tried by a jury unless a jury is waived or a reference to
a referee is ordered."' Other issues of fact are to be tried by the court
unless the parties consent or the court orders submission of the issues
to a jury 1 These two statutes make it clear that the legislature did
not intend all issues of fact for a jury.
By applying the terms of these statutes, the determination of when
one is entitled to a jury would seem to be a relatively simple matter.
If there is an issue of fact in an action to recover money or specific
real or personal property and if the jury has not been waived and the
case has not been referred to a referee, 0 then one is entitled to a jury;
otherwise, he is not. The difficulty is that the problem is not so easily
solved. In Dexter Horton Bldg. Co. v. King County,2 an action was
brought to recover taxes paid under protest. The defendant county
demanded a jury trial which was denied by the superior court. On
appeal the defendant contended that since this was an action to recover
money and a jury had not been waived, it was entitled to a jury trial
under RCW 4.40.060. The supreme court answered that it was clear
that the provision for jury trial on issues of fact for the recovery of
money applied to common law actions as distinguished from suits in
equity. The omission of that declaratory statement in the statute did
not deprive the courts of any of their inherent equitable powers. In
the immediate case, it was held that the plaintiff's right of recovery
1' RCW 4.44.090.
18 RCW 4.40.060.
19 RCW 4.40.070.20 The instances in which a reference to a referee may be ordered are specified in
RCW 4.48.010 and 4.48.020.
21 10 Wn.2d 186, 116 P.2d 507 (1941).
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was based on the doctrine of constructive fraud, which is equitable in
nature, and thus the defendant had no right to a jury.
One might conclude that the basic factor to be considered is whether
an action is legal or equitable in character rather than whether the
action is for recovery of money or specific real or personal property.
Other cases interpreting these statutes support this conclusion.! Like-
wise, the statutes relating to trials before referees speak in terms of
actions at law and in equity. Issues may be referred to a referee upon
the written consent of the parties, but either party has the right in an
action at law, upon an issue of fact, to demand a jury trial." If the
parties do not consent, the judge may direct a reference in cases for-
merly cognizable in chancery in specified instances.2 '
Finally, on the matter of pertinent statutes, RCW 4.44.100 provides
that in civil actions "triable by a jury" any party may obtain a jury
by making a timely demand and paying the required fee. This requires
an analysis of the cases interpreting the words "triable by a jury." It
is to these cases that our inquiry now turns.
LAw oR EQUITy
In determining one's right to a jury trial the courts have for the
most part been concerned with whether a legal or an equitable matter
is involved. 5 This has resulted from the usual interpretation given to
state constitutional provisions that there is a right to a jury in those
cases where a right existed at the time of the constitution's adoption,
namely, cases a law, but not in those instances where such right did
not exist, namely, suits in equity.
In distinguishing between law and equity two methods have been
used. The first is to analyze a case in terms of issues and to classify
the different issues in a suit as legal or equitable. The legal issues are
triable by a jury; the equitable issues, by the court. In a few instances
2 2 Main v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 167 Wash. 1, 8 P.2d 281 (1932) and Vicker-
man v. Kapp, 167 Wash. 464, 9 P.2d 793 (1932) (issues of fact are triable without ajury where action sounds in equity although action is for recovery of money) ; Moberg
v. McCauley, 150 Wash. 494, 273 Pac. 739 (1929) (although complaint asks for moneyjudgment, jury trial may be denied where accounting required for settlement of part-
nership); Boozer v. Boozer, 139 Wash. 34, 245 Pac. 403 (1926) and Goupille v.
Chaput, 43 Wash. 702, 86 Pac. 1058 (1906) (jury trial denied in action for money
where accounting required); Peterson v. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co., 33
Wash. 464, 74 Pac. 585 (1903) (action to recover specific real property to which
equitable defenses are raised is triable without a jury).
23 RCW 4.48.010.
24 RCW 4.48.020. See Lindley v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash. 581, 107 Pac. 355 (1910)
and Poultry Producers' Union v. Williams, 58 Wash. 64, 107 Pac. 1040 (1910) to the
effect that the compulsory reference of a cause requiring an accounting is not an
unlawful deprivation of jury trial.
25 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, § 16 (2d ed. 1947).
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the Washington court has recognized such practice as being proper on
the part of the trial courts.26 It has been suggested that under this
approach the court should first decide the equitable issues and in the
meantime stay the determination of the legal issues."7 It would seem
that if this order is not logical or convenient in a particular instance
it could be altered by the trial court. The equitable issues are to be
heard and decided out of the hearing of the jury.28
While no cases have been found wherein this practice has been dis-
approved by the Washington court, it is not the common method of
distinguishing between law and equity matters. Rather a case is
analyzed and then classified as a whole as being either legal or equit-
able. If classified on an over-all basis as legal, there is a right to a
jury trial as to all issues involved; if classified as equitable, there is
no right to a jury trial on any of the issues in the case.29 The principle
has also been sometimes stated by the proposition that if one of the
main issues in an action is equitable, equity takes jurisdiction for all
purposes, and there is no right to trial by jury.?
In classifying an action the question arises whether one is to look
solely to the prayer for relief in the complaint, or the complaint in its
entirety, or all of the pleadings. This question might be broken down
into two parts. First, assuming the defendant simply denies the allega-
tions in the plaintiff's complaint and does nothing in the way of plead-
ing to change the nature of the action, should one look solely to the
prayer for relief in the complaint to determine whether the action is
legal or equitable? While the prayer is important, it is not necessarily
the determining factor. In Main v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 1 an
action was brought by a purchaser of land to recover the amount paid
on a real estate contract. In his prayer for relief the plaintiff sought
only money damages. The court held that for the plaintiff to recover,
it was necessary that the contract-be rescinded. This then was actually
a suit for rescission, equitable in nature, and there was no right to a
jury trial. The court stated, "The appellant in his complaint, it is
28 See Gillingham v. Phelps, 11 Wn.2d 492, 119 P.2d 914 (1941).27 Peterson v. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co., 33 Wash. 464, 74 Pac. 585
(1903).
2 1 Peoples State Bank v. Driscoll, 143 Wash. 401, 255 Pac. 134 (1927).29 Millett v. Pacific Cider & Vinegar Co., 151 Wash. 561, 276 Pac. 863 (1929);
Crawford & Conover, Inc. v. Traynor, 147 Wash. 648, 267 Pac. 39 (1928); Thiel v.
Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 Pac. 1081 (1922) ; Installment Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Went-
worth, 1 Wash. 467, 25 Pac. 298 (1890).
80 Coleman v. Highland Lumber, Inc., 46 Wn.2d 549, 283 P.2d 123 (1955) ; Maas v.
Perkins, 42 Wn.2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953) ; Waagen v. Gerde, 36 Wn2d 563, 219 P.2d
595 (1950) ; Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 174 Wash. 200, 24 P.2d 613 (1933).
81167 Wash. 1, 8 P.2d 281 (1932).
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true, prayed only for a money judgment, but this is not controlling.
Whether the action was one at law or equity must be determined from
the facts alleged in the complaint, and not from the prayer for relief to
which the pleader may think he is entitled."' Likewise, in actions on
insurance policies where the plaintiff prayed for the filling in of blank
spaces in a policy 8 and for reformation by the striking of certain pro-
visions,' the court looked at the complaints in their entirety and
concluded the actions were at law and there was a right to a jury.
Assuming the defendant does more than simply deny the plaintiff's
allegations, as by setting up an affirmative defense or seeking relief
himself, what will the court consider? In a number of cases the Wash-
ington court has held that all of the pleadings must be considered and
not just the complaint. Or, as sometimes stated, where the defendant
does more than just deny, the right to a jury trial depends on all of
the pleadings."5 It seems further that by virtue of admissions and
stipulations at the trial the nature of an action might be changed, so
that, assuming a demand, a right to trial by jury might arise regardless
of the contents of the pleadings. 6
The determination of whether an action is legal or equitable is pri-
marily for the trial court. Wide discretion is vested in the lower court,
subject to reversal only in the event of clear abuse." In exercising this
discretion, the historical and emotional factors favoring one's right to
a jury must be kept in mind. This has lead to the proposition that
where the nature of an action is doubtful, the right to a jury is to be
presumed.88
These then are the fundamental principles which have guided the
Washington court: primary determination for the superior courts,
presumption in favor of a jury, and classification of actions as a whole
on the basis of all the pleadings. It is difficult enough in many in-
32167 Wash. 1, 5, 8 P2d 281 (1932).
- Gattavara v. General Ins. Co., 166 Wash. 691, 8 P.2d 421 (1932).
1' Reynolds v. Canton Ins. Office, 98 Wash. 425, 430, 167 Pac. 1115 (1917). "The
facts pleaded in the complaint would indicate that it was an action at law. The fact
that there was a prayer, not only for judgment for the amount of the policy, but for
reformation thereof, would not necessarily change the character of action as made by
the allegations of the complaint."
8 v. Reeves, 160 Wash. 282, 294 Pac. 995 (1931); Millett v. Pacific Cider &
Viea Co., 151 Wash. 561, 276 Pac. 863 (1929) ; Nolan v. Pacific Warehouse Co.,67 as. 173, 121 Pac. 451 (1912) ; Lindley v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash. 581, 107 Pac. 355(1910).
8 See Sunset Pacific Oil Co. v. Clark, 171 Wash. 165, 17 P.2d 879 (1933) and
Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
87 Coleman v. Highland Lumber, Inc., 46 Wn2d 549, 283 P.2d 123 (1955) ; Gatudy
v. Acme Const. Co., 196 Wash. 562, 83 P.2d 889 (1938).38 Bain v. Wallace, 167 Wash. 583, 10 P.2d 226 (1932) ; Houston v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 166 Wash. 611, 8 P.2d 434 (1932).
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stances to classify individual issues as equitable or legal. Add to this
the problem of classifying an entire case, often containing numerous
issues, and it becomes evident that to understand what the court has
done necessitates an attempt at categorizing different types of cases.
One such special category, which can be best treated by itself, is
that wherein an accounting is required. In an action requiring a long
and complicated account, the court has discretion to refer the case to
a jury, or a referee, or to decide itself. There is no right to a jury trial. 9
This is true even though an additional cause of action not requiring an
accounting is joined in the same complaint, 0 and regardless of whether
any partnership or other fiduciary relation exists between the parties. 1
Though this can be explained, in part, on the fact that such proceed-
ings were formerly cognizable in chancery, a more important factor
modernly is that a jury has no facilities for keeping records of items
going to make a complicated account. It is believed to be more likely
that justice will result if such actions are left to the judge or a referee.
This does not mean that the mere fact that an accounting is neces-
sary will deprive one of his right to a jury." The accounting required
must be of such complexity that a jury cannot satisfactorily adjust it,
keeping in mind the objective of protecting the right to a jury when
in doubt. 3 Thus in personal injury actions where it is often difficult
to estimate damages in money, trials to a jury are a matter of course."
In Watkins v. Siler Logging Co.,"5 an action was brought for the
conversion of the plaintiff's logs. The complaint stated a clear legal
cause of action with the plaintiff seeking only money damages. To
ascertain the damages, an accounting was necessary resulting from the
fact that there were a considerable number of conversions involved.
The court stated that a claim based on tort did not become equitable
in character merely because the claim consisted of a number of items
and was therefore somewhat difficult to present to a jury. The fact
that matters are multifarious, though not individually complex, will
not deprive a party of his constitutional right to a jury.
Perhaps the best way to categorize other cases is by grouping them
39 Peabody v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 164 Wash. 26, 2 P.2d 714 (1931);
Moberg v. McCauley, 150, Wash. 494, 273 Pac. 739 (1929); Boozer v. Boozer, 139
Wash. 34, 245 Pac. 403 (1926) ; Levy v. Simon, 119 Wash. 179, 205 Pac. 426 (1922);
Garey v. City of Pasco, 89 Wash. 382, 154 Pac. 433 (1916).
40 Dunlap v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 93 Wash. 568, 161 Pac. 364 (1916).
41 Lindley v. McGlauflin, 57 Wash. 581, 107 Pac. 355 (1910)
42 Carlisle Packing Co. v. Deming, 62 Wash. 455, 114 Pac. 172 (1911).
4s Peters v. Dulien Steel Prod., Inc., 39 Wn2d 889, 239 P2d 1055 (1952).
"See Gatudy v. Acme Const. Co., 196 Wash. 562, 83 P.2d 889 (1938).
45 9 Wn.2d 703, 116 P.2d 315 (1941).
19591
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
in accordance with the types of allegations of the plaintiff and the
defendant in their respective pleadings. Assuming the plaintiff sets
out an equitable cause of action in his complaint and the defendant
simply denies the allegations, it is clear that neither party has a right
to a jury trial.46 If the primary relief sought by the plaintiff is equit-
able, as an injunction, specific performance, rescission, or reformation,
the fact that incidental damages are involved is of no consequence4
A comparable situation arises where the plaintiff pleads an equitable
cause of action and the defendant either sets up an affirmative equit-
able defense or a counterclaim seeking equitable relief. Here again it
is clear that neither party is entitled to a jury.-" Further, the plaintiff
cannot create a right to trial by jury by waiving his request for equit-
able relief. 9
If the plaintiff states an equitable action and the defendant counter-
claims for legal relief, the defendant is not entitled to a jury on his
cause of action. In Installment Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Wentworth,"' the
plaintiff sought to foreclose on a mechanic's lien. The defendant set
up a claim for damages for breach of contract and demanded a jury.
Though the defendant was entitled to interpose his claim and would
have been entitled to a jury if he had maintained a separate action, by
raising it in conjunction with the plaintiff's equitable action, he lost
his right to a jury. Similarly, if the plaintiff asks for equitable relief
against several defendants and in the same action one defendant seeks
legal relief from the other defendants, there is no right to a jury.',
An exception to this principle is established by Northern Life Ins.
Co. v. Walker. 2 The insurance company initiated an equitable action
to cancel a life insurance policy. The beneficiary counterclaimed on
the policy, seeking legal relief. Ordinarily the defendant in such a
situation is not entitled to a jury. In this instance he was.
The explanation for this exception is that under the present statutes
regulating pleading a defendant is not compelled to set up any counter-
46 Sheane Auto Co. v. Williams, 143 Wash. 352, 255 Pac. 147 (1927) ; Da Ponte v.
Simonian, 127 Wash. 214, 220 Pac. 799 (1923); Bluett v. Wilce, 43 Wash. 492, 86
Pac. 853 (1906) ; Jackson v. Tatebo, 3 Wash. 456, 28 Pac. 916 (1892).
47 Reser v. Labude, 103 Wash. 228, 173 Pac. 1093 (1918).
48 See Crawford & Conover, Inc. v. Traynor, 147 Wash. 648, 267 Pac. 39 (1928).
49 Where the case had been set for trial before the court and the defendant had
prayed for equitable relief, the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial by waiving his
prayer for equitable relief. Nelson v. Lewiston-Clarkston Improvement Co., 131 Wash.
235, 229 Pac. 1027 (1924).
50 1 Wash. 467, 25 Pac. 298 (1890).
51M. A. Maher & Co. v. Farnandis, 70 Wash. 250, 126 Pac. 542 (1912) ; Wheeler
Osgood & Co. v. Ralph, 4 Wash. 617, 30 Pac. 709 (1892).
52 123 Wash. 203, 212 Pac. 277 (1923).
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claim. 3 A defendant can, if he wishes, maintain a separate action on
any legal claim he may have against the plaintiff and thereby obtain a
jury. If instead the defendant elects to plead his legal cause of action
as a counterclaim against the plaintiff's equitable cause of action, this
in effect amounts to a waiver of the defendant's right to a jury. In the
Walker case, however, the defendant beneficiary could not have waited
and later brought a separate legal action on the policy. If the insurance
company had been successful in its equitable action to have the policy
cancelled, there would have been nothing left for the defendant to
litigate later before a jury. If the defendant had not been granted a
jury on the basis of his legal counterclaim, he might never have
gotten it.
To deny the defendant a right to a jury on his counterclaim would
have meant that an insurance company might always deprive the
beneficiary of trial by jury by commencing a suit in equity to cancel
the policy before the beneficiary has occasion, or is required, to com-
mence his law action seeking recovery on the instrument. It is not
clear from the Washington cases whether this principle is limited to
suits on insurance policies, although there is dictum in the Walker case
indicating that it applies to all written instruments for the payment
of money when the obligor seeks cancellation of the instrument and
the obligee counterclaims for recovery on the instrument. As will be
discussed later in greater detail, it is probable that the principle of the
Walker case will be considerably extended by the provisions for com-
pulsory counterclaims in the new rules of pleading, to become effective
January 1, 1960.
To turn to another series of categories, assuming that the plaintiff
pleads a legal cause of action and the defendant simply denies the
allegations, either party is entitled to a jury upon demand. This in-
cludes, for example, suits for money damages which would formerly
have been actions of covenant, debt, special assumpsit, general assump-
sit, trover, and trespass on the case. Similarly, if the plaintiff sues on
a legal defense or a legal counterclaim, both parties are entitled to a
jury.5"
It is to be noted that the defendant cannot deprive the plaintiff of
his right to a jury merely by pleading a defense in an affirmative form.
In Theodore v. Washington Na'l Inv. Co.," the plaintiff brought an
53 RCW 4.32.090 and 4.32.100.
:4 Fleming v. Buerkli, 159 Wash. 460, 293 Pac. 462 (1930).5 164 Wash. 243, 2 P.2d 649 (1931).
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action in replevin for the recovery of bonds. The defendant in his
answer pleaded affirmatively, asserting title to the bands and asking
that title be quieted in him. The court held that while the answer was
affirmative in form, it was in effect only a general denial and thus did
not deprive the plaintiff of his right to a jury. The proposition was
set forth that an answer, affirmative in form, will not have, for the
purpose of trial, any different effect than a general denial unless, under
it, evidence becomes admissible which would not be admissible under
a general denial.
However, because of the whole action principle adopted by the
Washington court, a plaintiff whose complaint sets forth an action at
law can be deprived of his right to jury trial if the defendant in fact
pleads for affirmative equitable relief."' By such pleading the de-
fendant likewise thereafter has no right to a jury."
As has been indicated, the court will not be bound by the form of
the defendant's answer but rather by its effect. Thus, even though
the defendant does not pray for affirmative equitable relief, if the
court concludes that that is the actual purport of the answer, there
will be no right to a jury."8 On the other hand, even if affirmative
equitable relief is prayed for by the defendant, this will be of no con-
sequence if deemed to be only incidental to the defense."9
The question arises whether the pleading of an equitable defense
will result in the denial of right to a jury if no affirmative relief is
sought. In Reed v. Reeves60 an action at law was brought to recover
a broker's commission. The defendant pleaded fraud. The court
stated that the issue of fraud could be determined in either a law action
or in equity. Since no equitable relief, i.e., rescission, had been sought
by the defendant, the court held that the defense should be treated as
one at law." Clearly the case holds that if a defense is pleaded that
55 Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac. 143 (1928) (action against attorney
for money had and received; attorney claimed lien; plaintiff had no right to a jury) ;
Nolan v. Pacific Warehouse Co., 67 Wash. 173, 121 Pac. 451 (1912) (legal action to
recover damages for breach of contract; defendant cross-complained for foreclosure of
trust deed; plaintiff had no right to a jury trial).57 Vickerman v. Kapp, 167 Wash. 464, 9 P.2d 793 (1932) ; Millett v. Pacific Cider
& Vinegar Co., 151 Wash. 561, 276 Pac. 863 (1929) ; Santmeyer v. Clemnmancs, 147
Wash. 354, 266 Pac. 148 (1928); Thiel v. Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 Pac. 1081 (1922).
58 Crawford & Conover, Inc. v. Traynor, 147 Wash. 648, 267 Pac. 39 (1928).59 Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. L. Romano Eng'r Corp., 188 Wash. 290, 62 P.2d
445 (1936) ; Ban v. Wallace, 167 Wash. 583, 10 P.2d 226 (1932) ; Fleming v. Buerkli,
159 Wash. 460, 293 Pac. 462 (1930).
60 160 Wash. 282, 294 Pac. 995 (1931).
ftIn Houston v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 Wash. 611, 617, 8 P.2d 434 (1932)
the rationale of Reed v. Reeves, that fraud can be decided at law as well as in equity,
was applied even though affirmative equitable relief, cancellation of an insurance policy,
was sought by the defendant company. Perhaps the case is to be explained upon the
[Vor-34
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
could be interpreted as either legal or equitable and if no affirmative
relief is sought, then the defense will be treated as a legal one and there
will be a right to a jury. It also suggests that if an equitable defense is
asserted, but no affirmative relief is sought, there is still a right to a
jury, though this is not as clear from the opinion. No direct holding
on the point has been found in Washington. However, the court has
quoted the following statement with approval, "An equitable defense
not involving affirmative equitable relief interposed in an action at
law for a strictly defensive purpose does not change the character of
the suit as an action at law or take away the right to a jury trial.""2
In view of the Washington court's general application of the whole
action doctrine, another problem presented is whether a plaintiff can
join a legal and an equitable cause of action and thereby deprive the
defendant of his right to a jury trial as to the legal cause. In an early
case,83 it was stated in dictum that this could not be done.
It is necessary at this point to keep in mind the proposition that
once equity has obtained jurisdiction for one purpose, it has jurisdic-
tion for all purposes, and there is no right to a jury trial as to any of
the issues involved. Numerous instances may be found where equit-
able and legal issues of fact have been involved and it has been held
that there was not right to a jury. This is true, not because of the
whole action concept applied by the Washington court in interpreting
the constitution, but because such cases were equity cases before the
adoption of the constitution and have, of course, continued to be
treated as such. Where the plaintiff brought an action on promissory
basis that the court deemed the relief sought to be incidental to the defense. More
likely, however, is the explanation that this is a public policy exception applying to
insurance cases. "[W]here the beneficiary under a policy of life insurance commences
a law action for recovery upon the policy, the beneficiary can not be divested of the
right to have her cause submitted to a jury by the defendant's filing of a cross-com-
plaint for cancellation of the policy." Compare this case and Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Walker, 123 Wash. 203, 212 Pac. 277 (1923) (another insurance case) with Stusser v.
Gottstein, 187 Wash. 660, 61 P.2d 149 (1936) (a non-insurance case).
62 Watkins v. Siler Logging Co., 9 Wn2d 703, 713, 116 P2d 315 (1941). The court
also quoted from CoRPus JuRis as follows: "The interposition of an equitable defense
to a legal cause of action does not convert the case into a suit in equity so as to deprive
plaintiff of his right to a jury trial, nor does defendant by setting up an equitable de-
fense lose his right to have any legal issues arising upon plaintiff's claim tried by jury.
This rule, however, applies only to mere matters of equitable defense, for if the answer
contains not merely a technical defense but an independent equitable cause of action
constituting a cross demand in favor of defendant, the effect of which, if established,
would extinguish plaintiff's cause of action, the issue taken thereon is triable by the
court and not of right by a jury, and this is so whether issue is taken on the averments
of the complaint or not; but the rule applies only where the answer or cross bill sets up
an equitable defense or counterclaim, which, if true, destroys plaintiff's case; and, more-
over, such answer must show a case entitling defendant to affirmative relief necessary
to sustaining or ascertaining his rights."
83 Installment Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Wentworth, 1 Wash. 467, 25 Pac. 298 (1890).
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notes and to foreclose liens upon pledges of collateral security, the
defendant had no right to a jury." The foreclosure issue was equitable
in nature and thus equity assumed full jurisdiction. Likewise, where
an action was brought against several defendants for equitable relief
and, in connection with the same subject matter, another defendant
was joined for the purpose of obtaining damages, the latter defendant
had no right to a jury. 5 The court stated he was a proper party de-
fendant and that equity having obtained jurisdiction for one purpose,
in relation to the other defendants, had jurisdiction for all purposes.
In Lindley v. McGlauflini" the complaint contained three causes of
action. The first sought recovery against the defendant as the manager
of the plaintiff's business and required a long and complicated account-
ing. This was held to justify the assumption of jurisdiction by a court
of equity. The other two causes of action for conversion of certain
property and negligence in conducting the business were strictly legal.
The court held the defendant had no right to a jury as to the latter two
on the basis that they were matters growing out of the principal tran-
saction or connected with it in such a way as to be triable with the
equitable branch of the case, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
In each of these cases, though there were legal as well as equitable
issues involved, all arose out of the same general transaction. In each
instance the case would have been regarded as an equity case before
the adoption of the constitution and consequently it was so treated
after the constitution was adopted. No cases have been found where
the plaintiff has joined completely separate legal and equitable causes
of action and the question of the defendant's right to a jury as to the
legal cause has been presented. In such an instance, one seemingly
must rely on the early dictum, "[T]hat a plaintiff cannot, by joining a
legal with an equitable cause of action, deprive a defendant of his
right to a jury trial." 7
If the plaintiff joins an equitable and a legal cause of action in the
same complaint, the question is also posed as to whether the plaintiff
loses his right to a jury as to the legal cause. In Dunlap v. Seattle
Nat'l Bank," the plaintiff sought to recover certain money by alleging
fraud and a conspiracy by the defendants. This required an account-
64 Puget Sound Natl Bank v. Olsen, 174 Wash. 200, 24 P.2d 613 (1933).61 Murray v. Okanogan Live Stock & Dressed Beef Co., 12 Wash. 259, 40 Pac. 942
(1895).66 57 Wash. 581, 107 Pac. 355 (1910).
67 Installment Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Wentworth, supra, note 61 at 469.
68 93 Wash. 568, 575, 161 Pac. 364 (1916).
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ing and was held to be equitable in nature. The second cause was
conceded to be legal in character. It was held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to a jury trial. The court quoted from Pomeroy on Equity
Jurisprudence that "when a court has jurisdiction over a cause for any
purpose, it may retain the cause for all purposes, and proceed to a
final determination of all matters at issue." '  The court then said, "It
follows, therefore, that where two causes of action are stated in the
complaint, one of which is legal and the other equitable, equity takes
jurisdiction for all purposes and proceeds to a final determination of
all matters at issue."
It is possible that by this statement the court meant that the case
would have been one in equity prior to the adoption of the constitution
and therefore it continued as such after the adoption of the constitu-
tion. It is also possible, however, that the court was applying the
whole action concept to two separate causes of action, one of which
was legal and the other equitable. 0 If the latter interpretation is the
correct one, a plaintiff may lose his right to a jury by joining legal
and equitable causes of action in the same complaint.
It would seem that there is a basis for distinguishing between the
plaintiff and the defendant in the event of joinder of legal and equitable
causes of action. The plaintiff can decide whether to join or not. By
his election to join, one might well contend that the plaintiff has given
up his right as to the legal cause. The defendant, however, has no
such election in this instance and should not be deprived of his right
as to the legal cause. Certainly this would seem to be true if the two
actions are completely separate and do not arise from the same
transaction or subject matter.
EQUITABLE ACTIONS-ADvISORY VERDICTS
If by application of the whole action concept it is concluded that
the case is equitable in character, there is, as has been mentioned, no
right to a jury as to any of the issues involved. The trial court may,
however, submit equitable issues to a jury for an advisory verdict.
This is in the discretion of the trial judge, there being no right to even
69 1 PomERoy, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 181 (3d ed. 1905).
70 There is support for this interpretation in view of the court's treatment of the
Dunlap case in Gatudy v. Acme Const. Co., 196 Wash. 562, 570, 83 P.2d 889 (1938).
In the latter case the court seems to be speaking in terms of the whole action doctrine
rather than referring to cases which were triable in equity before the adoption of the
constitution, when it says, "It is undoubtedly the rule that, if any one of the main
issues in an action is equitable in its nature, the trial court may, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, hear the cause as an equitable proceeding."
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an advisory verdict so far as the parties are concerned.71 Where an
action against a tenant for unlawful detainer was brought and affirma-
tive equitable defenses were pleaded, the trial court could submit the
equitable issues to a jury.7 In an action for damages for the flooding
of land and for an injunction, it was not error to submit the damages
issue to a jury since even in purely equitable actions, the court may
submit all or any issuable question of fact to a jury.7
It is to be stressed that in such instances the verdict is advisory and
the trial court may disregard the verdict and make and enter its own
findings of fact." May the trial court on the other hand treat the
jury's verdict on equitable issues as binding? Is there, in other words,
a right to have equitable matters decided by the court just as there is
a right to a jury verdict of legal matters?
A few states have held that a litigant in an equitable action has a
constitutional right to a trial to the court.75 Although this view has
been criticized, 6 there have been holdings by the Washington court
consistent with this position. First, there are the many opinions
wherein it has been held that jury verdicts in equity cases are advisory
only, with the final decision on the facts resting with the judge.7
Further, there are cases where the superior courts have expressed the
opinion that jury verdicts on equitable issues were binding and the
supreme court has reversed. In one such case the superior court treated
the jury verdict as binding "regardless of the court's personal opinion."
This was held to be error.7 Though the judge has discretion to call a
jury as to equitable matters, he does not have discretion to treat its
verdict as binding. In another case the court stated, "In the very
nature of things, a judge cannot delegate his chancery powers to a
jury under any imaginable circumstances. 7 9
From this one may conclude that the superior courts do not have
71 Enos v. Hamblen, 79 Wash. 583, 140 Pac. 675 (1914) ; Reynolds v. Canton Ins.
Office, Ltd., 98 Wash. 425, 167 Pac. 1115 (1917); Gattavara v. General Ins. Co., 166
Wash. 691, 8 P2d 421 (1932).7 2 Himpel v. Lindgren, 159 Wash. 20, 291 Pac. 1085 (1930).
7Datnv. Union Gap Irrigation Co., 69 Wash. 303, 124 Pac. 1128 (1912).74 Coleman v. Highland Lumber, Inc., 46 Wn2d 549, 283 P.2d 123 (1955).75 Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N.W. 827 (1889) ; Callanan
v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868) ; Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397 (1909);
State v. Nieuwenhuis, 49 S.D. 181, 207 N.W. 77 (1926).
76 See BLUmE, AMERICAN CIVM PROCEDURE, pp. 371 and 418-419 (1955); CLARK,
CODE PLEADING, p. 102 (2d ed. 1947).
77 Benedict v. Hendrickson, 19 Wn.2d 452, 143 P.2d 326 (1943); Jackson v. Gard-
ner, 197 Wash. 276, 84 P.2: 992 (1938); McNeff v. Capistran, 120 Wash. 498, 208
Pac. 41 (1922); Pacific Commercial Co. v. Northwestern Fisheries Co., 115 Wash.
608, 197 Pac. 930 (1921).
78 Miller v. O'Brien, 17 Wn2d 753, 137 P.2d 525 (1943).
79 Goodwin v. Gillingham, 10 Wn2d 656, 660, 117 P.2d 959 (1941).
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discretion to treat a jury verdict on equitable matters as binding. To
that extent at least it appears that one has a right to a trial by the court.
Whether the legislature is precluded from granting a jury trial as of
right as to equitable matters is apparently an open question in this
state. Finally, on this point, there is authority that the parties them-
selves may stipulate for jury trial of equitable causes and jury findings
therein will be as binding as in law actions."
EFFECT OF NEW RuLrs OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
On January 1, 1960, the new rules of pleading, practice and pro-
cedure 7 through 25 and 42 will become effective in this state."'
The new rules require a re-evaluation of the right to jury doctrines
which have been applied in the past.
While the whole action doctrine has proved workable up to this
time, the liberal provisions for joinder of claims and parties under the
new rules will necessitate an application of the issue approach if the
object of the new rules of promoting fairness and convenience is to
be achieved. Instead of analyzing a case as a whole and classifying it
as legal or equitable, it is suggested that a better method will be that
of classifying the individual issues in a case as legal or equitable, with
the jury deciding the former, assuming a proper demand, and the
court, the latter.
It must be remembered that while the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton has approved the whole action approach and has most often applied
it in the past, it has never held that this approach must be followed.
This is illustrated by the fact that when the superior courts have used
the issue method, this likewise has been approved by the supreme
court.8  Rather than regard the whole action doctrine as required, the
court has treated it as permissible and preferable. Under the new
rules it is not preferable and one may question whether it should be
permissible.
Most of the cases in which the whole action doctrine has been
applied have involved situations wherein a counterclaim has been
asserted by the defendant and the question has been whether there
was a right to a jury. As has been discussed, if the plaintiff pleads an
80 State ex rel. Upper v. Hanna, 87 Wash. 29, 151 Pac. 83 (1915).81 The new rules and the changes they will make in present Washington procedure
are discussed in Meisenholder, The Effect of Proposed Rules 7 through 25 on Present
Washington Procedures, 32 WAsH. L. Rrv. 219 (1957) and 32 WAsH. L. REmv. 336(1957).(9 See Peterson v. Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co., 33 Wash. 464, 74 Pac. 585
(1903) ; Peoples State Bank v. Driscoll, 143 Wash. 401, 255 Pac. 134 (1927) ; Gilling-
ham v. Phelps, 11 Wn.2d 492, 119 P.2d 914 (1941).
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equitable cause of action and the defendant sets up a legal counter-
claim, it has been held that the defendant is not entitled to a jury."
The reason given has been that the defendant need not set up the
counterclaim, but rather can wait and institute a separate action later.
One exception has been recognized to this rule in that if the plaintiff
seeks to cancel an instrument by an equitable action and the defendant
sets up a legal counterclaim on the instrument, the defendant has a
right to a jury trial on his legal cause of action.'" In such a situation
the defendant cannot afford to wait and bring a separate action, since,
if the instrument is cancelled, there will be nothing left on which to
base a claim. The defendant must be granted his jury on his counter-
claim or he may never get it.
The new rule providing for compulsory counterclaims ' will require
an extension of this exception. In the past there have been no com-
pulsory counterclaims in Washington and thus it was true that the
defendant could ordinarily bring a separate action later. Under the
new rule 13(a) the defendant in certain instances does not have this
option of waiting. Those claims coming within the definition of com-
pulsory counterclaims must be pleaded as such or they will be lost."
Just as it was deemed unfair to deny the defendant a jury in the
circumstances of the Walker case, so it would be unfair under the new
rule to deny a defendant a jury in those instances where he must set
up a legal counterclaim against the plaintiff's equitable claim."' Here,
certainly, the issue approach rather than the whole action approach
should be applied.
What about the situations in which a permissive counterclaim is
pleaded? Under the new rule 13 (b) one may plead as a counterclaim
"any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
Any type of unrelated claim can thus be asserted against the opposing
party. This is much broader than the present Washington law on the
point.88
In the past if the plaintiff pleaded a legal claim and the defendant
an equitable counterclaim, or if the plaintiff pleaded an equitable
8 8 Installment Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Wentworth, 1 Wash. 467, 25 Pac. 298 (1890).84 Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, 123 Wash. 203, 212 Pac. 277 (1923).
85 Pleading, Practice & Procedure rule 13 (a).
86 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE § 13.12 (2d ed. 1948).
87 See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 79 S.Ct. 948 (1959) and particularly
Justice Stewart's statement in dissent at page 961, "Since Beacon's counterclaim was
compulsory under the Rules, see Rule 13 (a), it i3 apparent that by filing it Beacon
could not be held to have waived its jury rights."
88 RCW 4.32.100 and 4.32.110.
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claim and the defendant a legal counterclaim, the party with the legal
claim has not had a right to a jury. In view of the limited situations
in which a counterclaim could be pleaded, it perhaps made some sense
to apply the whole action doctrine since ordinarily the two claims
would be of the same character. With the greatly expanded concept
of counterclaims under the new rules, however, this likelihood will no
longer be present. The categories of claims and counterclaims which
may be asserted one against the other will be innumerable. Such being
the case there is less reason for the whole action principle.
Furthermore, so far as the defendant is concerned, since he is
encouraged to plead whatever claims he has as counterclaims under
the new rules, even though they may not be compulsory, it would seem
unfair to penalize him by denying him a jury if he acts in accordance
with the rule. By encouraging counterclaims, the rule seeks to promote
fairness and convenience by eliminating multiplicity of suits. The
defendant will be more willing to act to effectuate the object of the
rule if he knows that he will not be denied a jury if he pleads his legal
claim against the plaintiff's equitable claim.
The other area which poses the most difficulty concerns those in-
stances wherein the plaintiff joins legal and equitable causes of action
and the question of right to jury is raised by either party as to the
legal claim. Under the present statute the actions which may be joined
are divided into specified categories.89 The new rule 18(a) consider-
ably changes and liberalizes the old statutory provision in allowing
the joinder of "as many claims either legal or equitable or both" as
one party may have against the other. Here again it may be suggested
that there is less likelihood that the claims joined will be of the same
character than was true in the past. Since one is permitted to join
claims whether legal or equitable, it again seems unfair to penalize
either party if this is done, by denying him a jury as to the legal claim.
The issue approach would avoid this unfairness.
Add to all of this the greater liberality of the new rules in providing
for cross-actions against co-parties, 0 third-party practice," joinder of
parties,'" and intervention 3 and it becomes even more obvious that
the whole action concept will have to be discarded at least in part.
While it has been difficult enough to classify an entire case as legal
89 RCW 4.36,150.
90 Rule 13 (g), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure.
93 Rule 14, Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure.
92 Rules 19, 20, Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure.93 Rule 2, Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure.
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or equitable in the past, in those instances in which there is joinder of
multiple parties or claims or both under the new provisions, it will be
practically impossible to apply the whole action doctrine.
Mention should also be made of new rule 42(a), which provides
that "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice
may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues." While this
rule could be interpreted to mean that the trial court is thereby au-
thorized to order separate trials for legal and equitable matters, this
is not the primary purpose of the rule. Rather, in view of the liberal
rules for joinder of claims and parties, for counterclaims, and for in-
pleader of third persons, it is necessary to give the trial courts the
power to order separate trials to avoid prejudice to parties in particular
cases and to provide for convenient and manageable trials. It is the
purpose of this rule to provide the trial courts with such power."4 But
even without reliance on this rule, there is reason to apply the issue
approach in the future.9"
The simple fact is that the whole action approach has been adopted
without the new rules in mind. As has been stated several times, the
objective of these rules is to assure greater fairness and convenience
to the parties by eliminating some of the technicalities that have grown
up around code pleading. One such technicality is that of categorizing
cases as a whole. The adoption of the new rules provides an oppor-
tunity, and a necessity in many instances, for the court to redefine its
approach and determine right to jury questions by analyzing issues.
In this way those issues deemed to be equitable in nature can continue
to be decided by the court while as to those legal in character, the
parties will be accorded their constitutional rights.
94 See Meisenholder, The Effect of Proposed Rules 7 through 25 on Present Wash-
ington Procedures: Part II, 32 WASH. L. REv. 336, 374.
9 The principle of separate trials has been applied to jury and non-jury issues.
5 MooRE, FEDRsAI. PRAcTicE § 42.03 at 1214 (2d ed. 1951).
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